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BACKGROUND 
 
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act) was signed into law 
on February 17, 2009, as a way to jumpstart the U.S. economy, create or save millions of 
jobs, spur technological advances in science and health, and invest in the Nation's energy 
future.  This national effort will require an unprecedented level of transparency and 
accountability to ensure that U.S. citizens know where their tax dollars are going and how 
they are being spent.  As part of the Recovery Act, the Department of Energy will receive 
more than $38 billion to support a number of science, energy, and environmental initiatives.  
Additionally, the Department's authority to make or guarantee energy-related loans has 
increased to about $127 billion.  The Department plans to disburse the vast majority of the 
funds it receives through grants, cooperative agreements, contracts, and other financial 
instruments.   
 
The supplemental funding provided to the Department of Energy under the Recovery Act 
dwarfs the Department's annual budget of about $27 billion.  The infusion of these funds 
and the corresponding increase in effort required to ensure that they are properly 
controlled and disbursed in a timely manner will, without doubt, strain existing resources.  
It will also have an equally challenging impact on the inherent risks associated with 
operating the Department's sizable portfolio of missions and activities and, this is 
complicated by the fact that, in many respects, the Recovery Act requirements represent a 
fundamental transformation of the Department's mission.  If these challenges are to be 
met successfully, all levels of the Department's structure and its many constituents, 
including the existing contractor community; the national laboratory system; state and 
local governments; community action groups and literally thousands of other contract, 
grant, loan and cooperative agreement recipients throughout the Nation will have to 
strengthen existing or design new controls to safeguard Recovery Act funds. 
 
PROTECTING TAXPAYER INTERESTS 
 
To aid the Department in this effort, the attached report informs the Department's 
leadership of the perspective of the Office of Inspector General on the risks that it should 
consider as stimulus activities progress.  Our report is based on a body of work that has 
been used, over time, by Department officials to improve operations and management 
practices in a number of areas.  Considered in today's light, our work should once again 
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be useful in helping to avoid problems encountered in the past.  To that end, this report 
provides the Department with "lessons learned" and suggests approaches for reducing the 
risks associated with the extraordinary level of Recovery Act funding.  The report also 
outlines ongoing and planned Office of Inspector General activities designed to help 
ensure that the Recovery Act programs are well managed and that funds are protected 
from waste, fraud and abuse.  Specifically, in this report we have: 
 
• Identified specific risks that we discovered during past reviews and investigations in 
areas such as fund accountability and reporting, grant and cooperative agreement 
execution, contract management, and the management of loan guarantee efforts;  
 
• Suggested actions that should be considered during Recovery Act planning and 
program execution to help reduce the likelihood that historical problems will recur; 
 
• Described the Department's initial efforts to identify risks and to develop strategies to 
help ensure that Recovery Act goals and objectives are satisfied; and, 
 
• Outlined the Office of Inspector General's risk-based approach to oversight and 
planned means of satisfying our Recovery Act review and investigative 
responsibilities. 
 
RISKS OF FRAUD AND OTHER ABUSES 
 
As the Recovery Act implementation proceeds, all parties should recognize that the potential 
risk of fraud increases dramatically when large blocks of funds are quickly disbursed.  Our 
experience in the investigative arena has demonstrated that even during periods of normal 
operation, misuse of funds, submission of false or fictitious data, kickbacks and briberies, 
and other related fraudulent activity occur with troubling frequency.  In fact, the Office of 
Inspector General, on average, has more than 200 fraud-related investigations open at any 
given time.  Since Fiscal Year 2004, these investigations have resulted in about 150 criminal 
convictions and recoveries and fines in excess of $190 million, some of which involved task 
force investigations into complex fraud schemes that crossed agency boundaries.  This 
history suggests that the Department's Recovery Act efforts to establish an effective set of 
safeguards or internal controls to prevent fraudulent activity should be a priority. 
 
OVERSIGHT STRATEGY 
 
In carrying out our oversight responsibilities, the Office of Inspector General plans to initiate 
real-time reviews and, where needed, rapid investigations of the Department's Recovery Act 
activities.  Our proactive strategy is designed to aid the Department in enhancing program 
efficiencies and preventing or quickly detecting the misuse of funds.  For instance, we have 
already begun an aggressive effort to provide fraud awareness briefings throughout the 
Department to alert program officials about potential schemes and acquaint them with the 
investigative responsibilities of the Office of Inspector General.  These briefings have proven 
to be particularly useful to program officials and have, in a number of instances, facilitated 
their ability to recognize fraud and bring those matters to our attention.  We have also 
coordinated our efforts with the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and plan to work 
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with state and local oversight organizations to make the most efficient use of resources at all 
levels of government.  Under the Department's Cooperative Audit Strategy with management 
and operating contractors, we recently issued supplemental planning guidance for the 
contractors' internal auditors requesting that they incorporate Recovery Act objectives in 
their annual audit plans. 
 
We recognize that the Department has initiated a number of efforts to help ensure that it 
achieves the transparency and accountability objectives of the Recovery Act.  In particular, 
the Department is actively involved in identifying program and activity-specific risks and has 
begun to develop plans to address those risks.  It has also started to update information 
systems to provide accountability and transparency over Recovery Act expenditures and 
performance results.  In addition, the Department has requested program and project-level 
operating plans from each of its major program elements detailing its risk mitigation 
strategies, internal controls, performance measures, and methods for the collection and 
reporting of data.  Program officials also reported that they have reached out to potential 
recipients of funds to stress the importance of meeting Recovery Act objectives.  These 
efforts, when complete, should help position the Department to satisfy its Recovery Act 
responsibilities. 
 
MANAGEMENT REACTION 
 
In commenting on our report, management indicated that it had taken a number of corrective 
actions to address specific problems identified in our prior reviews.  In particular, 
management noted that the GAO recently recognized progress made by the Department in 
the areas of contract and project management and has narrowed the scope of this high-risk 
area to focus on only two major programs.  In addition, the Department established a 
program to provide assistance to field sites for awarding and administering contracts as part 
of its contract management improvement strategy.  Management agreed to re-evaluate the 
potential risks identified in our report at all sites in light of the significant additional funding 
provided under the Recovery Act. 
 
During these challenging times, we look forward to working with the Department to ensure 
that goals and objectives of the Recovery Act are met and that the best interests of the 
citizens of the United States are protected. 
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Background and  The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009  
Introduction (Recovery Act) was signed into law on February 17, 2009, 
as a way to, among other things, jumpstart the U.S. 
economy, create or save millions of jobs, spur 
technological advances in science and health, and invest in 
environmental protection activities.  The Recovery Act will 
require agencies to implement an unprecedented level of 
transparency and accountability that will permit the 
American people to determine how and for what purpose 
their tax dollars are being spent.  To assist Federal agencies 
with carrying out their Recovery Act responsibilities, the 
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) recently issued 
guidance designed to meet crucial accountability objectives 
regarding the distribution of funds, transparency of agency 
efforts to the public, and achievement of program goals. 
 
As part of the Recovery Act, the Department of Energy 
(Department) was appropriated more than $38 billion to 
support a number of major initiatives.  Specifically, the 
Offices of: 
 
• Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy will 
receive nearly $17 billion to support various 
programs such as improving the energy efficiency 
of low-income housing, conducting energy research 
and development projects, and studying alternative 
fuels for vehicles; 
• Chief Financial Officer will be provided with $6 
billion as part of its loan program for new or 
significantly improved energy production 
technologies that avoid, reduce, or sequester air 
pollutants and other greenhouse gases; 
• Environmental Management has been authorized 
nearly $6 billion to clean up environmental 
contamination resulting from Cold War 
manufacturing activities; 
• Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability will 
have $4.5 billion available, most of which is 
dedicated to support modernization of the Nation's 
electrical grid; 
• Fossil Energy will receive $3.4 billion to support 
research and development activities such as carbon 
capture and storage; and, 
• Science is expected to be provided with $1.6 billion 
to further enhance ongoing research efforts. 
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These funds will have significant impacts on existing 
Departmental missions.  For example, the additional 
Recovery Act funds will increase the Department's ability 
to make or guarantee loans up to approximately $127 
billion. 
 
Because of our day-to-day work evaluating program 
operations, the Office of Inspector General (OIG) has a 
unique insight into the challenges the Department faces in 
its Recovery Act endeavors.  As such, we have leveraged 
our perspective to outline risks that the Department is likely 
to confront as it works to finalize its stimulus activities.  
The body of work on which this report is based has resulted 
in incremental improvements in operations and 
management practices (See Appendix 1).  Our past work, 
considered in today's light, is likely to be useful in helping 
the Department avoid the problems that could cause 
failures or adversely impact planned initiatives.  To that 
end, this report provides "lessons learned" and suggests 
mitigation approaches that the Department should employ 
to reduce the risks associated with managing the 
unprecedented levels of Recovery Act funding.  
Specifically, our report: 
 
• Identifies specific risks that we discovered during 
past reviews and investigations in areas such as 
fund accounting and reporting, grants and 
cooperative agreements, contract management, and 
loan guarantees;  
 
• Suggests actions that should be considered during 
Recovery Act planning and program execution to 
help reduce the likelihood that the same or similar 
problems will recur; 
 
• Describes the Department's initial efforts to identify 
risks and to develop strategies to help ensure that 
Recovery Act goals and objectives are satisfied; 
and, 
 
• Outlines the OIG's risk-based approach to oversight 
and planned means of satisfying our Recovery Act 
review and investigative responsibilities. 
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Identified Risk Areas  The Recovery Act will inject a significant amount of 
funding into Department programs that must be expended 
and managed over a short time-frame.  In addition, the 
requirements for agencies to implement unprecedented 
levels of transparency and accountability will present 
challenges that even the most well managed programs may 
find daunting.  Under these circumstances and based on 
past experience, we believe that a number of activities 
carried out by the Department need to be closely managed 
to help ensure that they satisfy Recovery Act goals.  These 
areas include funding accountability and reporting, 
awarding and monitoring of grants and cooperative 
agreements, contract management, and management of loan 
programs.  
 
Funding Accountability and Reporting 
 
Maintaining complete transparency of accounting and 
related reporting requirements are two key activities 
necessary to meet the Recovery Act objectives.  However, 
the influx of significant funding presents new challenges 
and risks that the Department will need to address.  
Specifically, OMB Implementing Guidance directs 
agencies not to co-mingle Recovery Act funds with other 
appropriations, a mandate that will require the Department 
to effectively track costs.  Efforts such as this can be 
challenging, as noted during our prior reviews of 
Departmental accounting practices.  In particular, we 
identified Department facilities and sites that were unable 
to reconcile differences between the costs reported in 
financial systems and expenditure levels reported in project 
documentation.   
 
Programs designed to help ensure that reported 
performance is complete, accurate, and transparent to the 
public could also be at risk of not achieving desired 
Recovery Act objectives.  For example, we previously 
reported that certain programs were unable to provide 
complete and accurate information to demonstrate the 
progress of their programs.  Notably, program elements had 
not reported performance information that was measurable, 
meaningful or sufficient to gauge the progress of ongoing 
initiatives.  We noted in 2006 that the Department had not 
established or collected meaningful performance metrics to 
evaluate the cost-benefit of grants distributed through the 
State Energy Program.  Even when energy savings 
performance data was submitted to program officials as 
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required, the Department had not acted to validate or 
compare actual results to those planned.  Investigations in 
other program areas also revealed instances of fabrication 
of data relating to the quality and progress of work 
completed, including the submission of false testing 
certifications and inaccurate information about compliance 
with safety requirements.  
 
To address the risk that program results may not be 
properly supported and reported, management should: 
 
• Ensure that mechanisms are in place to accurately 
account for funds as required by the Recovery Act; 
and, 
 
• Define appropriate, quantifiable performance 
metrics that measure the progress of programs 
funded by the Recovery Act and validate the results 
at intervals necessary to meet OMB reporting 
requirements. 
  
As stressed by the National Academy of Public 
Administration in a recent report, such controls are critical 
to establishing performance metrics that can serve as a 
mechanism to monitor performance and ensure 
accountability.  Also, without adequate accounting of funds 
and performance reporting that includes periodic validation 
of results, taxpayers' confidence that Recovery Act projects 
are meeting intended goals may be eroded. 
 
Awarding and Monitoring 
Grants and Cooperative Agreements 
 
Grants and cooperative agreements are financial assistance 
tools used by the Department to fund many of its research 
and development activities that support advances in energy-
efficient technologies and enhance the Nation's economic, 
environmental, and energy security.  These financial 
instruments are also the primary means for deploying funds 
for scientific research to educational and other research 
organizations.  Based on preliminary plans, the Department 
projects that it will disburse billions of dollars through 
grants and cooperative agreements, many related to energy 
efficiency, science, fossil energy, and electricity research 
and development.  While the use of grants and cooperative 
agreements can be an effective way to fund various 
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initiatives, these types of financial assistance tools also 
carry a number of demonstrated risks. 
 
A prominent risk that we identified in the past is that 
officials may not have always adequately focused on 
ensuring that projects funded through cooperative 
agreements were initially evaluated for financial and 
business viability.  For instance, our prior review of 
selected energy-related cooperative agreements found that 
the Department made an award to an entity for a major 
research and development project even though the recipient 
had been having financial and operational difficulties for 
years.  The recipient ultimately filed for bankruptcy and the 
project did not meet its final objective.  In that particular 
example, we observed that each Federal project manager 
had up to 50 projects to oversee – limiting their ability to 
effectively monitor performance.  In another case, certain 
projects related to energy research were funded even 
though program officials did not always know what the 
projects would cost or the scope of the effort. 
 
Our reviews have also established that program officials 
did not always take action to mitigate performance-related 
risks through effective monitoring of grants and 
cooperative agreements.  For instance, officials did not 
adequately monitor a fuel-cell development project and 
continued to fund the effort through a cooperative 
agreement even though the business partner determined 
that the market no longer supported the need for the end-
product.  In addition, recipients of awards were not always 
monitored to determine whether significant costs were 
properly supported.  In certain particularly troubling cases, 
officials had not ensured that funds were used for their 
intended purpose.  For example, reviews and investigations 
revealed that Federal funds had been inappropriately used 
to expand a golf course, improve city-owned water supply 
systems, and procure personal luxury items – purchases for 
purposes outside the scope of the financial assistance 
agreement. 
 
A recently released report by the National Procurement 
Fraud Task Force, which includes the U.S. Department of 
Justice, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and many 
Offices of Inspector General, has highlighted risks that 
grant awarding agencies often focused only on awarding 
the grant money and did not devote sufficient resources to 
the oversight of how those funds were spent.  Members of 
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the Task Force noted that some potential fraudulent acts 
that may be encountered are the use of grant funds for 
unrelated work, misrepresenting progress made for work 
funded by the grant, and falsification of data submitted by 
the grantee.  Indeed, our investigative work is consistent 
with Task Force findings.  We have, for instance, identified 
grantees that received Federal monies from multiple 
agencies for the same work and used Department funds for 
expenses outside the scope of the grant.   
 
To prepare for the vast increase in projects funded through 
grants and cooperative agreements, and to address the risks 
we have previously identified, the Department should take 
steps to: 
 
• Develop aggressive safeguards to ensure that 
financial and business risks are adequately assessed 
and addressed prior to initial award and that 
performance is monitored throughout the life-cycle; 
 
• Maintain Federal project manager-to-financial 
assistance awards ratios as necessary to ensure that 
projects receive adequate monitoring and oversight; 
and, 
 
• Adjust project management techniques to ensure the 
transparency of project data and ensure that specific 
OMB and Recovery Act monitoring and reporting 
requirements are met. 
 
Controls such as these are essential to ensuring that the 
massive surge in funds to be distributed through grants and 
cooperative agreements is adequately controlled and 
monitored.  Based on current plans, these funding 
mechanisms are to form a significant part of Recovery Act 
outlays and are therefore likely to be critical to achieving 
desired economic stimulus.   
 
Contract Management 
 
The Department uses contracts, including numerous 
subcontracts, as the primary mechanism for accomplishing 
its mission.  In particular, about 90 percent of the 
Department's workforce is made up of contractor 
personnel.  Similar to its normal mission activities, the 
Department anticipates that a significant portion of the 
work to be completed using Recovery Act funds will be 
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done through new and existing contracts.  As has been 
consistently demonstrated by the OIG and other 
government oversight organizations, contract management 
weaknesses across the Department represent a risk that, if 
not mitigated, is likely to increase the potential for fraud, 
waste, and abuse of Recovery Act funds.  
 
Projects not achieving their intended objectives within 
estimated cost, scope, and schedule has been a recurring 
problem or theme across the complex.  On many occasions 
over the past five years, we have identified various projects 
that significantly exceeded their initial scope and cost 
estimates and were not completed on time.  A number of 
these projects were in areas that are now projected to 
receive substantial Recovery Act funds, particularly 
environmental cleanup and waste management.   
 
Specific weaknesses we identified involved incomplete 
project planning, inadequate performance metrics, 
insufficient contracting and monitoring staff, and 
ineffective change control processes.  Performance-based 
incentive fees were also not always adequately managed.  
As a result, we found one instance where a contractor 
received incentive awards for work that could not be 
completed and another where incentive fees were 
disproportionately high for the work performed.  The 
majority of the problems we discovered could have been 
mitigated by effective Federal contract oversight and 
project management.  In addition, we noted that a 
comprehensive and effective risk management strategy 
could have helped organizations identify and mitigate risks 
that lead to issues such as cost increases and schedule 
delays. 
 
The risk that contractors, including sub-contractors, claim 
and receive payments for unallowable costs could also 
increase as the Department expands its contracting 
activities under the Recovery Act.  Our review of work in 
this area has demonstrated that these issues are recurring 
problems across many of the Department's sites and 
programs.  In one recent report, for example, we disclosed 
that a support service contractor at a national laboratory 
received payments that were questionable, inappropriate, 
excessive, or unsupported.  At least one investigation 
resulted in multiple criminal convictions for employees of a 
Department contractor who carried out a scheme to submit 
fictitious bills for reimbursement and launder money 
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through related companies.  In addition, our annual reviews 
of contractor-claimed costs routinely identify questionable 
costs that may be unallowable. 
 
As we also recently noted in our report on Management 
Challenges at the Department of Energy (DOE/IG-0808, 
December 2008), contract administration remains a 
significant vulnerability.  The Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) recognized progress made by certain 
Department programs relating to contract management, 
including both contract administration and project 
management.  In its January 2009 High-Risk Series report, 
GAO noted, however, that two major programs continue to 
be at high risk for fraud, waste, abuse, and 
mismanagement.  In response to contracting weaknesses, 
the Department indicated that it has taken numerous 
corrective actions and developed an action plan to address 
remaining problems.   
 
As part of ongoing efforts to improve its contract 
management activities, and as it develops a Recovery Act 
risk mitigation plan, we suggest that the Department take 
steps to: 
 
• Implement effective contract and project 
management practices to better manage scope, cost, 
and schedule of new and existing contracts; 
 
• Establish performance metrics to effectively 
measure contractor progress and results; 
 
• Ensure that performance-based incentive fees are 
appropriate; and, 
 
• Evaluate contract costs, as needed, to determine 
whether they are reasonable, allowable, and 
allocable. 
 
The actions described above should help prepare the 
Department to address the contracting associated risks 
anticipated with increased Recovery Act funding.   
 
Direct Loans and Loan Guarantees 
 
Based on the Recovery Act and previously authorized 
programs, the Department has been authorized to make or 
guarantee loans totaling up to $127.5 billion for a variety of 
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energy related purposes.  The Department is responsible for 
soliciting and evaluating loan applications, approving loan 
guarantees, and monitoring project and loan guarantee 
performance.  While this program carries with it many 
potential economic and energy related rewards when 
projects meet their objectives, both the OIG and the GAO 
have noted that there are a number of risks associated with 
administering the program. 
 
The Department has been engaged in significant 
preparatory work developing policies and procedures to 
mitigate risks associated with loan activities.  Based on an 
analysis of similar loan guarantee programs administered 
by other Federal agencies, we have reported on several 
risks that the Department should consider as it moves 
forward.  Specifically, in 2007, we identified risks 
associated with adequately evaluating loan proposals and 
borrowers' ability to repay, monitoring project 
performance, and acting appropriately to protect the 
Government's interest in the case of defaults.  Federal 
agencies' experience in such programs has also shown that 
there is a risk that participating lenders do not always 
comply with established monitoring procedures.  The 
Department may also be vulnerable to this risk because, for 
example, it is proposing that lenders participating in loan 
guarantees provide monitoring services.   
 
Another critical element we have reported on several 
occasions relates to whether the loan program is adequately 
staffed.  In 2007, we initially noted that our discussions 
with Federal agencies showed that a capable and proficient 
staff is an essential element to establishing an effective loan 
program and minimizing costly mistakes.  More recently, in 
2009, we observed that the Department did not have 
adequate staff to administer its loan program.  Although the 
Department had finalized its policies and procedures, the 
lack of adequate staffing presents a significant risk to the 
Department in effectively administering this nationally and 
economically important program. 
 
Accordingly, to help ensure that its loan programs are 
successful, we suggest that the Department: 
 
• Ensure adequate staff are available to implement the 
loan programs; and, 
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• Effectively evaluate loan proposals and borrowers' 
ability to repay, monitor projects to identify early 
warning signs of performance problems, and act 
appropriately to protect the taxpayers' interests in 
the event of loan guarantee defaults. 
 
By mitigating risks inherent in its loan programs, the 
Department may be able to minimize the overall cost of the 
program to the taxpayers and improve the timeliness of its 
loan application evaluations, approvals and disbursements. 
 
Department of Energy  To prepare for the unprecedented levels of additional  
Response to funding that many of its programs will receive as a result 
Recovery Act of the Recovery Act, the Department has initiated action to 
address the challenges associated with meeting 
transparency and accountability requirements.  Officials 
commented that they have taken corrective actions related 
to many of the findings identified in previous audits and 
were working to implement additional actions.  After 
reviewing a draft of our report, management also 
acknowledged that it was important to re-evaluate potential 
risks associated with past reports at sites other than those 
included in the initial reviews and in light of the significant 
additional funding provided under the Recovery Act. 
 
Based on our preliminary meetings and information 
obtained from the Department, we learned that some of the 
specific actions that management is in the process of taking 
include: 
 
• Identifying risks that the Department, and its 
programs in particular, may encounter as they 
prepare to fulfill their obligations under the 
Recovery Act;   
 
• Developing risk mitigation strategies; 
 
• Preparing spending plans that emphasized timely 
obligation of funds; 
 
• Performing outreach to potential fund recipients to 
emphasize their responsibilities for transparency 
and accountability for the funds with which they are 
entrusted;
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• Developing standardized language for grant and 
contract recipients to meet the objectives of the 
Recovery Act;  
 
• Creating program and project-level implementation 
plans detailing risk mitigation strategies, internal 
controls, performance measures, and methods for 
the collection and reporting of data; and, 
 
• Ensuring that Headquarters and field managers 
certify that they recognize responsibility for 
accountability and internal controls over their 
respective programs. 
 
As an example of its efforts, the Office of Environmental 
Management recently brought together its field office 
managers and representatives from its major contractors to 
emphasize their responsibilities for transparency and 
accountability in the expenditure of Recovery Act funds.  
In addition, the Chief Financial Officer is leading Recovery 
Act accountability efforts and is working with each of the 
program offices to identify risks, develop related mitigation 
strategies, and implement performance reporting 
requirements.  Program officials also told us that they are 
developing alternative means to mitigate recognized risks 
such as staffing shortages by hiring term and contractor 
employees and making procedural changes to their 
programs.  
 
Office of Inspector  The overarching goal of our oversight strategy is to ensure 
General Recovery Act that the taxpayers' interests are protected.  As specified by  
Oversight Strategy the Recovery Act, the OIG will provide oversight critical to 
economic recovery.  In particular, we have adopted a risk-
based review and investigative strategy that is consistent 
with OMB accountability objectives.  As part of that 
strategy, the OIG has developed a Ten-Point Program that 
includes, among other things, evaluations of internal 
controls over funds management, whistleblower protection 
programs, and fraud awareness activities. 
 
We have produced a risk-based approach to oversee issues 
relevant to Recovery Act funding.  Oversight will occur 
through a multi-faceted approach, including the following 
activities: 
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• Initially concentrating on reviewing the 
Department's internal control structure and 
management of programs exceeding $500 million;    
 
• Examining the efficiency and effectiveness of funds 
distribution by the Department to state and local 
governments;  
 
• Examining the use of funds, through transaction 
testing, by contractors, subcontractors, and financial 
assistance recipients; 
 
• Reviewing Department developed metrics that are 
intended to gauge program success; 
 
• Assessing program performance and outcomes by 
comparing actual results to metrics on a real-time 
basis; 
 
• Providing fraud awareness briefings throughout the 
Department; 
 
• Refining existing relationships with state and local 
law enforcement, geared to aggressively pursuing 
fraudulent activities; 
 
• Expanding and enhancing Hotline capabilities to 
respond to allegations of fraud, waste, and abuse; 
and,  
 
• Expanding whistleblower protection programs and 
complaint evaluations. 
 
In addition, the Inspector General will serve as a member 
on the Recovery Act Accountability and Transparency 
Board, an organization established by the Recovery Act to 
coordinate government-wide oversight. 
 
As we execute our program, we expect there to be a 
significant increase in reviews, investigations, and 
whistleblower and Hotline complaints.  Based on prior 
experience, we are anticipating an additional 500 Hotline 
complaints, 200 criminal investigations, and 30 to 35 
retaliation complaints each year.  We also anticipate 
additional reviews of how the Department, its contractors, 
and other recipients account for and use Recovery Act 
funds.  To help ensure success, the OIG plans to realign 
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existing employees and increase overall staffing to 
facilitate additional reviews, investigations, and 
whistleblower protection and complaint evaluations.   
 
While many activities to oversee Recovery Act funds are in 
their planning stage, numerous other actions are already 
underway.  For example, several reviews that address the 
adequacy of controls over programs that are likely to be the 
primary vehicles for distributing funds are currently in 
progress.  Similarly, we have adjusted our annual risk 
assessment process to identify the highest risk stimulus-
related areas within the Department, including those in the 
energy, environmental, and science programs.  We have 
also coordinated our efforts with the GAO and plan to work 
closely with state and local oversight organizations to make 
the most efficient use of oversight resources.  Finally, 
under the Department's Cooperative Audit Strategy with 
management and operating contractors, we recently issued 
supplemental planning guidance for the contractors' 
internal auditors to incorporate Recovery Act objectives in 
their annual audit plans. 
 
Potential Impacts The Department will undoubtedly encounter various 
challenges while attempting to provide adequate 
accountability and transparency of its activities designed to 
meet the objectives of the Recovery Act.  Although many 
of these challenges will require significant efforts on the 
part of Departmental programs, by aggressively addressing 
known problem areas early, the ability to mitigate the risks 
identified in this report may be greatly enhanced.   
 
However, inaction may hamper the Department's ability to 
achieve the objectives set forth in the Recovery Act and 
related implementing guidance issued by OMB.  For 
instance, absent effective tracking of costs and reporting of 
program progress, stimulus activities may lose credibility 
with and support of taxpayers.  Additionally, failing to 
address known weaknesses related to the management of 
contracts and financial assistance tools such as grants and 
cooperative agreements may result in projects that exceed 
estimated costs, take longer than necessary to complete, 
and ultimately do not meet their intended objectives. 
 
In addition to our reviews, external organizations such as 
the GAO, the National Academy of Public Administration, 
and the National Procurement Fraud Task Force have also 
urged implementation of effective controls over the same or 
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similar areas identified by our previous body of work (See 
Appendix 2).  In particular, the GAO disclosed that the 
Department could encounter significant financial risks 
without an effective loan guarantee program.  Furthermore, 
the National Procurement Fraud Task Force recently issued 
a guide to preventing and detecting grant related fraud and 
noted that a significant amount of Federal dollars are lost 
each year to grant fraud.   
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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORTS BY RISK AREA 
 
 
REPORT KEY FINDINGS DEMONSTRATED RISKS 
Funding Accountability and Reporting 
W76 Life 
Extension 
Project  
(DOE/IG-0729, 
May 2006) 
 
 
The program was at risk of not achieving the 
first production unit within the established 
scope, schedule, and cost parameters.  
Problems occurred because the W76 project 
plan was not completed until more than five 
years after the project began.  Individual site 
schedules were also not consistent with the 
overall master schedule.  Further, reasons for 
changes to the project's baseline were not 
documented. 
 
 
• Program goals not achieved
• Use of funds not 
transparent 
• Project delays and/or cost 
overruns 
Department of 
Energy 
Contractor 
Home Office 
Expenses  
(DOE/IG-0676,  
February 
2005) 
The Department did not always ensure that 
reimbursements to contractors were limited to 
an equitable share of their home office 
expenses.  They agreed to pay for home 
office expenses that were duplicative, not 
adequately documented, improperly 
calculated, and unallowable.  This occurred 
because contracting officials did not 
adequately review contractor cost proposals, 
nor did they require the contractor to report 
actual incurred expenses.   
 
 
• Unauthorized use of funds 
• Use of funds not 
transparent 
Restoration of 
the Monticello 
Mill Site at 
Monticello, 
Utah 
(DOE/IG-0665,  
October 2004)  
Over 60% of the funding provided through a 
cooperative agreement for the restoration and 
long-term maintenance of the Site was spent 
on non-Site related projects such as golf 
course expansion and public water supply 
system improvements, for which the 
Government received no direct benefit.  This 
occurred because the Department had not 
properly structured and did not require 
compliance with certain terms of the 
cooperative agreement.  Additionally, the city 
inter-mingled the Departmental funds with its 
General Fund. 
 
 
• Use of funds not 
transparent 
• Unauthorized use of funds 
• Project delays and/or cost 
overruns 
• Program goals not achieved
 
Idaho National 
Engineering 
and 
Environmental 
Laboratory's 
Strategic 
Initiative Fund  
(DOE/IG-0601, 
May 2003) 
A Department contractor utilized funds 
specifically set aside for marketing mission 
development opportunities for questionable 
purposes, such as supplementing their 
Laboratory Directed Research and 
Development program and paying for 
program office activities; and for activities that 
did not directly support the laboratory's 
primary mission.  This occurred because, in 
the absence of Department policy or clear 
contractual requirements, the contractor 
 
• Unauthorized use of funds 
• Program goals not achieved
• Use of funds not 
transparent 
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established its own very broad informal 
guidelines to manage the fund.  
 
Oversight 
Funds 
Provided to 
Local 
Governments 
in the State of 
Nevada  
(DOE/IG-0600, 
May 2003) 
Departmental funds provided to the State of 
Nevada for oversight of the Yucca Mountain 
Project were used for prohibited activities 
such as hiring non-oversight lobbyists and 
attorneys, sponsoring anti-Yucca Mountain 
Project events, and purchasing supplies, 
materials, and services for their own 
operations.  Interest earned from these funds 
was also retained instead of reinvested as 
required.  The responsible program office did 
not sufficiently monitor the use of oversight 
funds received by the state because it had 
not ensured that program plans were 
completed before providing the funding.  
Additionally, funds were not provided based 
on actual expenditures nor was the 
allowability of expenditures reviewed.  
 
 
• Unauthorized use of funds 
• Program goals not achieved
• Use of funds not 
transparent 
Awarding and Monitoring Grants and Cooperative Agreements 
Management 
Controls over 
Monitoring 
and Closeout 
of Small 
Business 
Innovation 
Research 
Phase II 
Grants  
(OAS-M-08-09,  
July 2008) 
 
The Department was not closing out SBIR II 
grants in a timely manner, with many grants 
remaining open over three years after the 
completion of the grant term.  This occurred 
because problems with insufficient staffing 
and resources required them to focus their 
attention on active awards rather than grant 
close out. 
 
 
• Use of funds not 
transparent 
• Unauthorized use of funds 
• Project delays and/or cost 
overruns 
• Program goals not achieved
 
Management 
Controls over 
the State 
Energy 
Program's 
Formula 
Grants  
(OAS-M-06-05,  
April 2006) 
The Department did not regularly perform on-
site monitoring of State Energy Offices to 
ensure that grant funds were being used for 
their intended purpose and had not 
established or collected meaningful 
performance metrics to determine the 
cost/benefit of the Program in meeting its 
goals.  Additionally, while consolidating their 
six regional offices at the National Energy 
Technology Laboratory and the Golden Field 
Office, Energy Efficiency and Renewable 
Energy had not specified how it would assign 
responsibility for or staff the program 
monitoring function within these entities. 
 
 
 
 
• Unauthorized use of funds 
• Program goals not achieved
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Management 
of Fossil 
Energy 
Cooperative 
Agreements  
(DOE/IG-0692, 
July 2005) 
Issues reported with cooperative agreements, 
due in part to uncorrected previously 
identified issues and a lack of Federal 
monitoring and oversight, included the 
following: 
  
• Not subjected to sufficiently detailed 
pre-award analysis; 
• Projects not always adequately 
defined prior to award; 
• Lack of risk management plans; 
• Funds obligated prior to making a 
decision to proceed; 
• No cost analysis for scope reduction 
without funding decrease; 
• Some required technical and financial 
reports waived by Department 
officials; and, 
• No prior performance review of 
potential awardees before award. 
 
 
• Project delays and/or cost 
overruns 
• Program goals not achieved
 
 
 
Selected 
Energy 
Efficiency and 
Renewable 
Energy 
Projects  
(DOE/IG-0689, 
May 2005) 
Federal project managers either had not 
completed or did not document technical and 
merit reviews of the projects.  They also had 
not performed required site visits, and in 
some cases were unfamiliar with the nature 
and progress of the agreements for which 
they were responsible.  These problems 
occurred because the Department did not 
devote sufficient attention or resources to 
managing its cooperative agreements.  
Project management officials were 
responsible for monitoring up to 50 projects 
simultaneously. 
   
 
• Use of funds not 
transparent 
• Unauthorized use of funds 
• Project delays and/or cost 
overruns 
• Program goals not achieved
 
 
Management 
Controls over 
Administration 
of the WERC 
Project  
(OAS-M-04-03, 
May 2004)  
The Department did not always ensure that 
this Congressionally directed project was 
accomplishing its goals or that reimbursed 
costs were appropriate, because officials 
were not substantially involved in monitoring 
the project.  Specifically, they were not 
always aware of project activities and 
accepted documents for planning, budgeting, 
and expenditures that lacked the amount of 
detail needed for monitoring. 
 
 
• Use of funds not 
transparent 
• Unauthorized use of funds 
• Program goals not achieved
 
The McNeil 
Biomass 
Project  
(DOE/IG-0630, 
December 
2003)  
We found that the Department continued to 
provide financial assistance to the project 
even though there was little or no progress in 
meeting annual programmatic performance 
objectives because program managers did 
not devote adequate attention to monitoring 
progress against project milestones.   
 
 
• Project delays and/or cost 
overruns 
• Program goals not achieved
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Inspection of 
Savannah 
River 
Operations 
Office 
Management 
of Emergency 
Response and 
Law 
Enforcement-
Related 
Grants  
(DOE/IG-0604, 
June 2003) 
 
The Department was not adequately 
managing grants to Georgia and South 
Carolina and did not have documentation to 
support whether or not the grant recipients 
were on schedule and meeting milestones.  
Specifically, the Department was not 
receiving many of the required deliverables 
and was also not following up on the 
delinquent deliverables.  Furthermore, there 
was not a formal system in place for tracking 
grant deliverables. 
 
 
• Project delays and/or cost 
overruns 
• Program goals not achieved
 
Contract Management 
Contract 
Transition 
Activities at 
the Nevada 
Test Site  
(OAS-M-08-02,  
November 
2007) 
Contract transition costs and activities were 
not fully effective in safeguarding Federal 
records and ensuring contract terms and 
Federal regulations were followed.  
Specifically, employee concern records were 
not retained due to confusion regarding 
contractual requirements, and questionable 
relocation costs were incurred. 
 
 
• Unauthorized use of funds 
• Program goals not achieved
 
Work Order 
Estimate and 
Cost Issues 
for Site 
Support 
Services  
at Los Alamos 
National 
Laboratory  
(DOE/IG-0780, 
October 2007) 
 
The actual costs for Los Alamos National 
Laboratory's support services contractor 
exceeded estimated costs by more than 20% 
for work order tasks over 75% of the time.  In 
addition, questionable labor and material 
charges were also found related to this 
contractor.  These issues occurred due to 
internal control weaknesses associated with 
the laboratory's work control system. 
 
 
• Use of funds not transparent
• Unauthorized use of funds 
• Program goals not achieved
  
 
 
Performance-
Based 
Contract 
Incentives at 
the Hanford 
Site  
(DOE/IG-0739,  
September 
2006) 
The Department's limited financial resources 
were applied to incentivize environmental 
cleanup end-states that were not readily 
attainable and fees were paid for work that 
could not be completed.  This occurred 
because the performance-based contract 
incentives that they developed were not 
realistic, achievable or adaptable to changing 
circumstances. 
 
 
• Use of funds not 
transparent 
• Program goals not achieved
 
Management 
Controls over 
Performance 
Fees in the 
Idaho National 
A number of the Department's performance 
fees were disproportionately high for the work 
performed and/or were implemented well 
after the associated performance period 
began.  This resulted from a lack of balance 
 
• Program goals not achieved
• Unauthorized use of funds 
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Laboratory 
Contract 
(OAS-M-06-07,  
August 2006) 
between achieving programmatic priorities 
and the difficulty level of performing the work, 
as well as ineffective communication between 
Headquarters and Field officials regarding 
their respective expectations.  
 
Follow-up 
Audit Report 
on the 
Department of 
Energy's 
Performance 
of the 
Miamisburg 
Closure 
Project  
(DOE/IG-0721,  
March 2006) 
 
Cost increases, schedule delays, pending 
milestones that appear unlikely to be met, 
and requested reductions in contract 
requirements have all been issues related to 
the project.  While additional work scope was 
the primary driver for these issues, we found 
that the Department had not adequately 
planned for uncertainties that it was aware of 
before and after awarding the current 
contract, including employee pension costs 
and soil volumes requiring remediation. 
 
 
• Project delays and/or cost 
overruns 
• Program goals not achieved
 
Report on 
Management 
Controls Over 
Subcontract 
Administration 
at the National 
Security 
Laboratories  
(OAS-M-04-06,  
August 2004) 
 
The Laboratories did not always ensure that 
audits were conducted, questioned costs 
were resolved, and completed subcontracts 
were closed in a timely manner, because they 
lacked appropriate controls and adequate 
staffing, and because the National Nuclear 
Security Administration had not developed 
specific performance measures related to 
subcontract administration.  
 
 
• Use of funds not 
transparent 
• Unauthorized use of funds 
 
 
 
Management 
Controls Over 
Subcontract 
Administration 
by the 
National 
Renewable 
Energy 
Laboratory 
(OAS-M-04-02,  
March 2004) 
Problems existed with the National 
Renewable Energy Laboratory's procurement 
cycle, such as (1) subcontractor acquired 
property that could not be located, (2) 
experimental property not included in 
inventories, and (3) failure to de-obligate 
unexpended funds or recover property 
associated with completed or expired 
contracts.  These issues occurred because 
the laboratory did not follow Departmental 
regulations on accounting for property, 
inventory requirements, and coordination with 
subcontractors.  In addition, a focused 
performance measure for contract closeout 
had not been developed. 
 
 
• Use of funds not 
transparent 
• Unauthorized use of funds 
• Program goals not achieved
 
Direct Loans and Loan Guarantees 
The 
Department of 
Energy's Loan 
Guarantee 
Program for 
The Department's Loan Guarantee Program 
was understaffed by as many as 21 
employees for it normal workload in fiscal 
year 2009.  This staffing limitation led 
management to focus resources on issuing 
 
• Funds not provided in a 
timely, fair, or reasonable 
manner 
• Program goals not achieved
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Innovative 
Energy 
Technologies  
(DOE/IG-0812,  
February 
2009) 
 
new solicitations at the expense of 
completing additional key controls to ensure 
that the program was well managed and that 
objectives were accomplished. 
 
 
 
Loan 
Guarantees 
for Innovative 
Energy 
Technologies  
(DOE/IG-0777,  
September 
2007) 
 
While the Department was implementing the 
Loan Guarantee Program, this report 
highlighted some lessons learned from past 
experience that should have helped foster the 
program's success.  Specific areas covered 
included program staffing, risk management, 
monitoring strategy, and liquidation.   
 
• Funds not provided in a 
timely, fair, or reasonable 
manner 
• Program goals not achieved
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REPORT KEY FINDINGS DEMONSTRATED RISKS 
Government Accountability Office 
American 
Recovery and 
Reinvestment 
Act – GAO's 
Role in Helping 
to Ensure 
Accountability 
and 
Transparency  
(GAO-09-453T,  
March 2009) 
 
GAO’s bimonthly reviews of selected states 
and localities will examine how Recovery Act 
funds are being used and whether they are 
achieving the stated purposes of the Act.  
Lessons learned and best practices noted in 
the report which can be helpful in addressing 
challenges to implementing the Recovery Act 
include fraud prevention, contract 
management, and grants accountability.  It 
presented specific practices in each area that 
should help ensure the accountability and 
transparency over the use of Recovery Act 
funds. 
 
 
• Use of funds not transparent 
• Unauthorized use of funds 
• Project delays and/or cost 
overruns 
• Program goals not achieved 
 
Contract and 
Project 
Management 
Concerns at the 
National Nuclear 
Security 
Administration 
and Office of 
Environmental 
Management  
(GAO-09-406T,  
March 2009) 
The cost increases and schedule delays for 
most of the projects GAO reviewed occurred 
as a result of inconsistent application of 
project management tools and techniques on 
the part of both the Department and its 
contractors.  Preliminary results from their 
review of a current National Nuclear Security 
Administration project indicate that project 
management concerns continue. Specifically, 
officials had not conducted a risk analysis on 
their current schedule using statistical 
techniques, and therefore could not 
adequately state their level of confidence in 
meeting the project’s completion date. 
   
 
• Use of funds not transparent 
• Unauthorized use of funds 
• Project delays and/or cost 
overruns 
• Program goals not achieved 
 
High-Risk Series 
– An Update  
(GAO-09-271,  
January 2009). 
This was GAO’s presentation on the status of 
the 30 areas across the Federal government 
that it has designated as high-risk.  GAO 
recognized progress in resolving certain 
issues, but noted that contract management 
was still considered a high risk area.  GAO 
specifically found that 9 of 12 major 
construction projects, with total costs of about 
$27 billion, exceeded original cost or schedule 
estimates, principally because of ineffective 
project oversight and poor contractor 
management by the Department. 
 
 
• Use of funds not transparent 
• Project delays and/or cost 
overruns 
• Program goals not achieved 
 
New Loan 
Guarantee 
Program Should 
Complete 
Activities 
Necessary for 
Effective and 
GAO reported that the Department is not well 
positioned to manage the loan guarantee 
program effectively and maintain 
accountability because it has not completed a 
number of key management and internal 
control activities.  As a result, the Department 
may not be able to process applications 
 
• Funds not provided in a timely, 
fair, or reasonable manner 
• Program goals not achieved 
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Accountable 
Program 
Management 
(GAO-08-750, 
July 2008) 
efficiently and effectively, although it has 
begun to do so.  They stated that the 
Department had not sufficiently determined 
the resources it will need or completed 
detailed policies, criteria, and procedures for 
evaluating applications, identifying eligible 
lenders, monitoring loans and lenders, 
estimating program costs, or accounting for 
the program.    
 
National Academy of Public Administration 
Office of Energy 
Efficiency and 
Renewable 
Energy: 
Reorganizing for 
Results 
(September 
2004) 
 
This report provides an assessment of the 
2002 reorganization of the Department’s 
Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable 
Energy.  The report included a number of 
forward-looking recommendations, such as 
developing indicators of program 
management performance and effectiveness 
to assess the results of the reorganization, 
creating mechanisms to hold staff 
accountable for new processes and 
procedures, and obtaining independent 
outside expertise to evaluate certain elements 
of its acquisition/financial assistance and 
project management operations.   
  
 
• Funds not provided in a timely, 
fair, or reasonable manner 
• Project delays and/or cost 
overruns 
• Program goals not achieved 
 
National Procurement Fraud Task Force 
A Guide to Grant 
Oversight and 
Best Practices 
for Combating 
Grant Fraud 
(February 2009) 
 
The report recognized that a large part of 
Government dollars lost to fraud, waste, and 
abuse includes dollars lost to grant fraud, and 
prepared this White Paper to discuss 
recommendations for agencies to consider in 
preventing and detecting fraud, waste, and 
abuse in the grants they administer.  The 
Task Force recommended the following: 
 
• Require the grantee to certify that its grant 
application statements are true and correct;
• Provide grant fraud training; 
• Maintain regular communication; 
• Take steps in the grants they award to 
create transparency; 
• Share information within and between 
agencies; and, 
• Provide active oversight and monitoring of 
the grantee by both grant administrators 
and the Office of Inspector General. 
 
• Use of funds not transparent 
• Unauthorized use of funds 
• Project delays and/or cost 
overruns 
• Program goals not achieved 
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